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Abstract 
The new social theories of practice have been inspired by Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy, phenomenology and more recent sociological theories. They regard 
embodied skills and routinized, mostly unconscious habits as a key foundation 
of human practice and knowledge. This position leads to an overstatement of 
the significance of the habitual dimension of practice. As several critics have 
suggested this approach omits the problems of transformative agency and 
change of practices. In turn classical practice theories, activity theory and 
pragmatism have analyzed the mechanisms of change. Pragmatism suggests 
that a crisis of a habit calls for reflection. Through working hypotheses and 
experimentation this leads to a transformation of a practice. Activity theory 
introduced the concept of remediation. A collective elaboration of shared 





The concept of social practice has been widely used in sociology and 
organisational studies to the point that many scholars have started to speak 
about the practice turn in social theory (e.g. Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Von 
Savigny, 2001; Reckwitz, 2002a; Stern, 2003). It is difficult to characterize this 
turn when there are so many partially overlapping, yet different approaches 
associated with it. Nevertheless, the term practice theory is largely identified 
with a group of sociologists and philosophers in the late twentieth century who 
either presented a fully fleshed-out theory of practice or who at least found 




(1984) and ethnomethodologists are often mentioned as social theorists, and 
Heidegger along with Wittgenstein in his later works are the philosophers cited 
as establishing the background for the new practice theory (see e.g. Schatzki, 
2001, p. 1; Reckwitz 2002a, pp. 243-244; Turner, 2007, p. 111; Rouse, 2007, p. 
501; Schmidt, & Volbers 2011, p. 19). Latour and other actor-network theorists 
are also often mentioned (e.g. Reckwitz, 2002a; Schmidt & Volbers, 2011), as 
is Foucault. Actor-network theory emerged from constructivist science and 
technology studies, which examined laboratory and scientific practices 
(Pickering, 1992) and also led to theoretical accounts of the concept of practice 
(Pickering, 1995; Rouse, 1996). 
Practice-based approaches were widely adopted in organisational 
studies in the 1990s, especially in organisational learning and knowledge 
management (Blackler, 1993; Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003; Brown & 
Duguid 2001). Since the 1990s several approaches have been developed to 
study strategy as practice instead of analysing strategy as rational decision-
making or planning (Whittington, 1996; Samra-Fredericks, 2003, 
Jarzabkowski, 2005). In organisational studies Schatzki’s (1996) and 
Reckwitz’s (2002a) understanding of practice theory are widely cited and used. 
That is why we will refer to the interpretations of those two scholars.  
We will suggest that an important shared feature of the new practice 
theories is their emphasis on habituality of practice, that is, the recognition of 
the primacy of pre-reflective embodied actions in contrast of individual 
rationality and conscious reflection. We suggest that this position makes it 
difficult for these theories to make sense of the change of human practices. In 




activity theory – a heir the of dialectical tradition – focused from the beginning 
to explain the change and development in human practices. They focus on how 
people can influence such changes when emerging problems or contradictions 
in practices are faced (Miettinen, 2006).  
Cultural-historical activity theory (Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 
1999) and sociocultural approaches (Chaiklin & Lave, 1993) have their roots in 
the work of the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky and his followers, who 
took up Hegel’s and Marx’s concept of work as an important starting point. 
Work is here understood as a prototype of creative activity mediated by tools 
and cultural artefacts and as a process in which humans simultaneously create 
both themselves and their material culture. In pragmatism, the crisis of 
established habits requires reflection of the condition of activity and the 
formation of a working hypothesis for the experimentation of a new way of 
acting. Both activity theory and pragmatism regard intervention and 
experimentation as a means of influencing the direction of the change, and both 
have developed methods of doing just that. Activity theory in particular, based 
on the concept of mediation by cultural artefacts, has developed a vocabulary 
for dealing with the materiality of human practice.  
In this paper we will proceed as follows. Firstly, we will discuss some 
of the differences between the classical and a selection of new postmodern 
theories of practice. Secondly, we will discuss the problem of habituality of 
practice and its consequences for making sense of the change of activities. 
Thirdly we will analyse the idea of reflection as a mechanism of transforming 
habits. Fourthly we will bring forth theories of artefacts in practice theories. We 




elaboration of shared meditational artefacts – suggested by the activity theory –
 is an essential part of the transformation of practices. In addition we suggest 
that an analysis is needed of the various functions that different artefacts play in 
activity.  
 
Bringing back the classical practice theories 
 
The concept of practice, or praxis, is not, of course, new, either in philosophy 
or in the social sciences. The first generation of practice theorising took place 
in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The ideas of this 
generation were summarised by the philosopher Richard Bernstein (1971) in 
his Praxis and action: Contemporary philosophies of human activity. Bernstein 
distinguished four philosophical approaches to practice. The first approach is 
the Hegelian tradition followed by Marx’s thesis on Feuerbach, in which Marx 
finds the solution to the dualist opposition between idealism and materialism in 
the concept of practice or objective activity. The second approach Bernstein  
discusses is Charles Peirce’s and John Dewey’s pragmatist theories of practice, 
based on the concepts of habit, inquiry and interaction between the human body 
and its environment. Thirdly he addresses the concepts of practice in 
existentialism discussed by such post-war authors as Jean-Paul Sartre, and 
fourthly the concept in analytical philosophy. 
As David Stern (2003, p. 188) points out, most of the accounts of the 
practice turn and theorizing do not refer, or refer only in passing, to these 
classical  philosophical antecedents of the practice concept. The philosophical 




Wittgenstein. Current practice approach could also be characterized as 
postmodern practice theory, since it is a “response to failures of projects of 
modernity or enlightenment” (Turner 2007, p. 110).  
We, in turn, find Bernstein’s (1971) distinction among his four 
philosophical approaches to praxis and action still relevant for depicting the 
differences and similarities among philosophical concepts of practice. Each of 
the philosophical traditions provide different basic concepts to make sense of 
practice or activity. Activity theory, an heir to Hegel and Marx, emphasises 
cultural (artefact) mediation and the object-orientedness of activity (Vygotsky, 
1978; Leont’ev, 1978). Pragmatism deals with habits and their transformation 
through reflection and inquiry (Dewey, 1929/1988). Critical realism and its 
theories of transformational human activity and intentional agency continue the 
analytical tradition today (Bhaskar, 1986; Archer, 2000).  
Phenomenology adopts from Heidegger (1962/2003) the idea of 
preconscious background knowledge. This background knowledge is often 
analysed in the way inspired by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945/2003) as 
embodied knowledge, that is, in the forms of bodily skills and dispositions. 
This idea resembles Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus and also resonates 
with the idea of tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1957/2002). Ethnomethodology, a 
sociological approach that emerged from phenomenology, highlights the 
following of tacit rules.  
Current discussion on practice theories emphasises phenomenologically 
inspired interpretations of practices as well as sociological approaches to 
habitus or routinized activities. In this paper we discuss Bhaskar’s 




versions of critical realism that contribute to the problem of change of 
practices. They are critical to the concept of habituality and deal with the 
problems of agency and role of artefacts in change of practices.  
Two first traditions analyzed by Bernstein, namely dialectical tradition 
– represented today by activity theory – and pragmatism are far less often used 
in these interpretations than are the phenomenologically influenced approaches, 
although new practice theories have absorbed influences from many directions 
(Schatzki, 2001; Reckwitz, 2002a).  If a single unifying feature of the current 
approach to practice should be named, then habituality – the primacy of 
routinized, prereflective, and/or unconscious, embodied actions and 
dispositions to actions in contrast to individual rationality and reflection –
 would be a good candidate.  
Many distinguished observers, however, have pointed out that a habitual 
concept of practice has difficulties in making sense of the change in practices or 
of the contribution of individual agency to the process of change (Emirbayer, & 
Mische, 1998; Knorr-Cetina, 2001; Shusterman, 2008). Emirbayer and Mische 
(1998, p. 983) observe that such theorists as Bourdieu and Giddens focus on 
low-level reflectivity and “do not show us how schemes of action can be 
challenged, reconsidered, and reformulated.” They (Emirbayer, & Mische, p. 
1006) find it important to create circumstances that “provoke or facilitate” 
human actors to gain imaginative distance from iterative, habitual responses, 
“thereby reformulating past patterns through the projection of alternative future 
trajectories.” Richard Shusterman (2008) finds that the reflective level of 
somatic consciousness helps to (Shusterman, p. 74) "acquire better means to 




(2001, p. 175) states that a habitual concept of practice is insufficient for 
making sense of what she calls knowledge-centered activities. The 
transformation of practices is emphasized also by critical realism (Bhaskar, 
1986). 
As suggested above, the first two traditions introduced by Bernstein, 
namely the dialectical tradition (the Hegelian/Marxist) and the pragmatist 
tradition, can be characterized as classical or modernist theories of practice, and 
they share many ideas with each other (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks, & Yanow, 
2009). The pragmatist concept of habit also has a family relationship to the 
concepts of habitus and dispositions, which are important for the new social 
theories of practice. However, both pragmatism and activity theory find 
reflection, inquiry and thought – rather than practical coping – instrumental for 
agency and for the transformation of practices. The social theories of practice 
inspired by phenomenology regard the concept of embodied skills and their 
unconscious adaptation to new situations as central to understanding human 
practice and give reflection and thought only secondary significance in human 
activity. On the other hand, without a concept of an artefact, reflection is easily 
transformed into individual thought, or into a formation of collectively shared 
ideas lacking contact with the materiality of human activity.  
 
Habituality, practical understanding and change of practices 
 
The ideas of habituality and the primacy of unconscious, embodied actions also 
call for a redefinition of knowledge and its role in human practices. According 




representational accounts of knowledge and meaning. The integrative 
foundation of doings and sayings in Schatzki’s theory of practice is “practical 
understanding.” Schatzki defines practical understanding by referring to 
another set of concepts developed by practice theorists:  
 
Examples of what I have in mind are Bourdieu’s habitus, otherwise called 
practical sense (“having a feeling for a game”), and Giddens’s practical 
consciousness (“tacitly grasping a rule”), both conceptualizations [sic] the 
phenomenon of knowing how to go on highlighted in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. Habitus and practical consciousness are 
alleged either always (Bourdieu) or often (Giddens) alleged to determine 
what people on particular occasions do. As a result, these phenomena also 
allegedly provide explanations of the particular actions involved. 
(Schatzki, 2002, p. 78-79.) 
 
All of these concepts refer to skills, dispositions, pre-discursive rules and 
schemes of action that underlie activity. These dispositions are the primary 
forms of knowledge, and they are mostly unconscious and/or pre-reflective. In 
this vein the philosophical (ontological) thesis of the primacy of practical, 
bodily interaction with the environment in relation to knowledge is extended to 
a theory of knowledge. The phenomenological position was well articulated by 
Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus (1997):  
 
Writers such as Henry Mintzberg and Robert Solomon, like us, think that 
skills are more important than theory when it comes to dealing with the 
real world. We go beyond these thinkers in that we claim, first, that the 
skills that form the background for dealing with people, things, and selves 
contain an understanding of what it is to be anything at all and that taking 
up such practices gives one an identity and so gives one’s life meaning 
…. (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, p. 191) 
 
Also, for the ethnomethodologists the attempts to reflect consciously and 
discursively the forms of activity, that is, formulations of activity, are mostly 




structure and rationality (Lynch, 1995).  
Karin Knorr-Cetina (2001, p. 175) has presented an explicit sociological 
critique of a habitus-, skill- and rule-based understanding of practice. In her 
view, research work and more generally professional work cannot be explained 
in terms of routine procedures. That is why she opts for the notion of practice, 
which is more dynamic and includes the potential for change. The challenge is 
“to dissociate the notion of practice somewhat from its fixation on human 
dispositions and habits, and from the connotation of iterative procedural 
routines” (Knorr-Cetina, 2001, p. 187). Knorr-Cetina thinks that, in a 
contemporary knowledge society, we need to understand the changes taking 
place in the knowledge processes themselves. To make sense of these we have 
to study their objectual relationships, the relationship of professionals to the 
objects of their work and practice. The objects themselves are changing in a 
‘knowledge society’. Compared with mass products or services, these objects 
are ever more complex, dispersed and in constant need of being redefined and 
reconstructed. This is why they can be characterized in terms of open, 
constantly unfolding epistemic objects or knowledge objects.  
 
The lack in completeness of being is crucial: objects of knowledge in 
many fields have material instantiations, but they must simultaneously be 
conceived of as unfolding structures of absences: as things that 
continually ‘explode’ and ‘mutate’ into something else, and that are as 
much defined by what they are not …than by what they are. (Knorr-
Cetina, 2001, p. 182) 
 
According to Knorr-Cetina (2001), for understanding epistemic practice, the 
process of object-subject differentiation is crucial. She argues that Heidegger’s 




unselfconscious, but nonetheless goal-directed employment of a ready-to-hand 
equipment. In such a being-in-the-world the equipment becomes transparent or 
invisible, and a subject does not think of him/herself as separate from the 
immediate activity. This is an adequate description of routine or habitual 
practice, even in research work. However, when such a practice becomes 
problematic, the undifferentiated unity is dissociated from a subject-object 
relationship in which the properties of the object become an object of knowing 
and transformation. In this relationship researchers actively search for and use 
resources to overcome the subject-object separation. 
Knorr-Cetina’s critique focuses on the change in the interaction between 
human subjects and increasingly complex objects. She, however, does not 
discuss the means of this interaction. The concept of mediation in activity 
theory underlines the interactive development of subject, cultural means and an 
object. A follower of Vygotsky, A.N. Leont’ev developed the idea of an 
objective, mediated structure of the human activity system. Human activity is 
object-oriented: “Activity necessarily enters into practical contact with objects 
that confront man, that divert it, change it, or enrich it” (Leont’ev, 1978, p. 56). 
The object of an activity, something to be transformed by the activity into a 
use-value, is a driving force behind the activity. The object of an activity is 
material, as well as simultaneously imagined and projected. Its formation and 
realisation take place by using a set of relevant mediational artefacts. When an 
object changes the means also need to be transformed. For example, the 
medical tools and procedures developed for treating infectious diseases do not 
on their own help in the treatment of diabetes or coronary diseases. The means 




remediation. An object of activity turns into a means: a product designed and 
fabricated becomes a tool for use in another activity. The changing 
interrelationship between objects of activity and the means of their realisation is 
an important way to make sense of the materiality of human practice.  
 
Breakdown of habits and reflection as explanations of transformation 
 
Most of the philosophical approaches to practice, phenomenology and 
Deweyan pragmatism, as well as activity theory agree that the bodily 
interaction of individuals with the material and social environment is primary to 
cognition and thought. All of them recognize (at least to some extent) that 
reflection, thought and future orientation are needed when established ways of 
doing things (ready-to-hand, habits, routine operations) break down, and novel 
solutions are needed (Koschmann, Kuutti, & Hickman, 1998). However, these 
phenomena are given different kinds of status in different approaches. While 
Heidegger regarded pre-reflective and pre-linguistic knowledge 
(philosophically) primary, he also focused on pre-linguistic forms of coping, 
leaving breakdowns as well as the processes and means of solving them largely 
out of his analysis.  
For pragmatism, the breakdown of established habits and the 
disequilibrium of a situation constitute the starting point for reflection. Peirce 
(1992-98) introduced abductive reasoning as a special process whereby people 
confront unexpected phenomena, search for clues and form new candidate 
hypotheses for solving a problematic situation (Paavola & Hakkarainen, 2005). 
Similarly, in Dewey’s theory, habit and inquiry are inseparable. To transform a 




central issue for Dewey was whether an authority-bound and routine way of 
acting could be replaced in a reconstructive and reflective way. Dewey’s model 
of enquiry and reflective action can be depicted in six phases (Figure 1, based 
on Dewey 1933/1986, pp. 199-208 and 1938/1991, pp. 105-122.). 
 
1. Disturbance and uncertainty:
   habit does not work
2. Intellectualization and
   definition of the problem
3. Studying the conditions of
   the situation and formation
   of a working hypothesis
4. Reasoning
5. Testing the hypothesis
   in action
Idea,
concept
Solution of the problem
and control of the action
 
Figure 1.  Dewey's model of reflective thought and action. The graphic 
presentation is taken from Miettinen (2000, p. 65).  
 
When an established habit no longer functions an uncertainty and a crisis 
emerge and call for reflective thought and investigation of the situation (phase 
1). The process of reflective thought starts with an attempt to define what is 
wrong in the situation (phase 2). The actor forms a tentative conception of the 





Without a problem, there is blind groping in the dark. The way in which 
the problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are 
entertained and which are dismissed; what data are selected and which 
rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of hypotheses 
and conceptual structures. 
 
The analysis and diagnosis of the conditions take place in phase 3. The 
conditions include both material and social conditions including the means and 
resources with which the problem is supposed to be solved. The presupposition 
of a possible solution is called a working hypothesis. A working hypothesis can 
also be characterised as a guiding idea or a plan. Reasoning (phase 4) is 
composed of the elaboration of the meaning of ideas in relation to each other. 
Through reasoning, thought experiments can be done. In phase 5 the working 
hypothesis is tested by trying to implement it in practice, by reconstructing a 
situation or an institutionalized way of acting. Dewey says that only the 
practical testing of the hypothesis in material activity makes it possible to draw 
conclusions about its validity (Dewey, 1916/1985, p. 328): 
 
Upon this view, thinking, or knowledge-getting, is far from being the 
armchair thing it is often supposed to be. (...) Hands and feet, apparatus 
and appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes in the brain 
(…) Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into 
it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of 
what physical acts and appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which 
they are employed and the distinctive results which they accomplish. 
 
 
Although Dewey recognized the significance of tools and the dependency of an 
aim on the relevant means, curiously, tools are not included in his theory of 
inquiry. The only artefact mentioned in his cycle is a working hypothesis. Since 




acquisition of new tools or the transformation of old ones is needed in order to 
experiment and change the situation or a practice.  
In Bhaskar’s transformational model of social activity (TMSA) 
representing critical realism people reproduce or transform existing social 
structures. Transformativity is part of a social ontology that provides solutions 
to several mistaken dualisms prevailing in social theory (Bhaskar, 1986, p. 
125): “the ontological errors of voluntarism and reification, the constitutive 
ones of individualism and collectivism and the epistemic ones of 
methodological individualism and social determinism.” Human activity is 
dependent on the materials, such as the means, media, resources and rules that 
it transforms. In characterizing the reflexivity of an intentional agent, Bhaskar 
(p. 128) resorts to psychological terminology: feelings, desires, want, practical 
skills, unconscious rules and rationalisations play a role in the process. An 
agent reproduces or transforms structures mostly in an unconscious and 
unmotivated way, although rational action is also possible (Bhaskar, p. 133). 
Artefacts are missing in Bhaskar’s account, although his model comes close to 
acknowledging them by emphasizing “human activity or praxis as essentially 
transformative or poietic, as consisting in the transformation of pre-given 
material (natural and social) causes by efficient (intentional) human agency” 
(Bhaskar, p. 122).  
The theory of expansive learning (Engeström, 1987), a recent version of 
activity theory, has made sense of the process of reflection in terms of 
collective remediation. This process first traces the historically-formed 
contradictions of an activity that causes disturbances, problems or breakdowns. 




proximal development is formed and is expected to resolve the contradictions. 
The process includes the modeling of the instruments for the projected new 
activity.  
In activity theory the idea of theoretical concepts as a means of 
envisioning the future is inspired by Vygotsky’s work on concept formation 
and by V.V. Davydov’s theory of generalisation and theoretical thinking in 
education (1977). In this methodology a theoretical concept also assumes the 
form of a germ cell, which refers to a new instrumentality and a corresponding 
form of action that is developed as a solution to the contradictions of an 
activity. The implementation and development of the germ cell may lead to the 
emergence of a new form of activity (Engeström, Engeström, & Kerosuo, 
2003). The reflection includes both concepts of and models for an alternative 
activity and the development of new tools and instrumentalities with which to 
experiment and develop the alternative (Miettinen & Virkkunen, 2005). 
Accordingly, the activity-theoretical approach regards retooling, that is, the 
shared creation of artefacts used, as a key of changing practices (Vygotsky, 
1986).  
 
Introducing mediating artefacts 
 
Recently there have been several attempts to clarify the fundamental role of 
artefacts in the change of activities and in the formation of agency. The 
sociologist Ian Burkitt calls cultural artefacts a prosthetic extension of the body 
and has emphasised how the human body and its capabilities are re-formed by 




instead of “memes” (Burkitt, 1999, p. 12). In his theory of the evolution of 
human consciousness the psychologist Merlin Donald has convincingly 
suggested that modern human consciousness cannot be explained as the result 
of biological evolution alone. Instead, the key is the external memory or the 
externalisation of memory (Donald, 2001, p. 262): “modern humans can 
employ a huge number of powerful external symbolic devices to store and 
retrieve cultural knowledge.”  
Bruno Latour has analysed the ways in which mankind (humanity) 
“delegates” tasks and norms to artefacts (Latour, 1992). As a result, technical 
artefacts have a script, an affordance, a function or a programme of action and 
goals (Latour, 1994). Human agency is here distributed between men and 
artefacts. This has been demonstrated in the empirical research conducted by 
Edwin Hutchins (1995), as well as in other investigations into distributed 
cognition (Goodwin, 1995). In these approaches, instead of working via 
cognitive processes in the head or in bodily schemes, human capabilities are 
preserved and transmitted, first of all, through the artefacts and the ways in 
which the artefacts are used.  Where this is the case, a theory of artefacts, 
including representational artefacts, is needed to understand the dynamics of 
the change in practices.  
Critical realist Clive Lawson (2007; 2010) has developed a theory of 
technological objects as an extension of human capabilities, and he provides a 
review of the extension theories. Electronic media can be understood as 
extensions of the information-processing functions of the nervous system. 
Radio, for example, is a long-distance ear. Lawson’s theory of technological 




realism and his transformational model of social activity. Lawson likewise 
underlines that human activity harnesses the causal powers or intrinsic 
properties of material artefacts. Technologies are relational: an artefact is 
interconnected with networks of social and technical interdependencies, which 
can be typified according to their functions in human activity. 
Lawson makes a distinction between different kinds of artefacts by 
means of the different kinds of causal powers within them (Lawson, 2007). 
Some artefacts (typically technical objects) derive their causal powers from 
their physical structure (a photocopier, for instance); other artefacts attain 
power more from their social relations and conventions (for example, a 
passport). Lawson’s discussion raises the key question of the interrelationships 
of technologies – understood as tools and equipment – with semiotic means in 
human activities, although he himself does not draw a distinction between tools 
and symbolic or semiotic artefacts.  
In activity theory and in the dialectical tradition (Ilyenkov, 1977b; 
Lektorsky, 1980) the objectification of activity into artefacts is emphasized as a 
key mechanism in the development of culture. A human being creates 
him/herself in the process of changing a part of the world and a culture, with a 
corresponding transformation of the mediational means. Human activity is 
objectified into cultural artefacts (Ilyenkov, 1977a, Lektorsky, 1980). The 
embodiment of forms of human activity within artefacts is the primary means 
of learning and transmitting human achievement wherein the role of individual 
agents is also important. “All forms of activity (active faculties) are passed on 
only in the form of objects created by man for man” (Ilyenkov, 1977b, p. 277). 




through its objectifications into material forms, such as artefacts. Vladislav 
Lektorsky (1980, p. 137) finds that norms, procedures and knowledge are 
embodied in artefacts: “The instrumental man-made objects function as 
objective forms of expression of cognitive norms, standards and object-
hypotheses existing outside the individual.” 
Vygotsky (1978) made the distinction between two basic types of 
mediational means, tools and signs. Although tools and signs are both cultural 
means, they differ in the way that they orientate an activity. Tools are 
externally orientated and are used to transform objects. Signs are used to 
coordinate the actions of individuals in a collaborative activity. Signs are also 
used as psychological tools, that is, to direct and control an individual’s 
behaviours and actions. In his Thought and Language (1986) Vygotsky showed 
that this function develops through the internalisation of language, first into 
internal speech and then into individual thought. Although he made a 
distinction between tools and signs, Vygotsky emphasized that the 
interpenetration of these two types of artefacts is the foundation of specifically 
human activity (1978, p. 24): “Although practical intelligence and sign use can 
operate independently of each other in young children, the dialectical unity of 
these systems in the human adult is the very essence of complex human 
behaviour.” 
 
Towards a theory of change 
 
Pragmatism and activity theory differ from the recent social theories of 
practice. Social practice theories have been developed in the context of 




clarify a social ontology, to explain social order and to provide a solution to the 
perennial problems of sociology, such as the relationship between structure and 
agency. In such a theoretical context the discussion of agency is easily seen as a 
remnant of methodological individualism. Many practice theorists suggest co-
evolutionary, reciprocal, relational, transactive or dialectical views and a 
mutual constitution of self, practices and structures. These suggestions do not 
supply accounts of the mechanisms by which individuals or collaborative 
agents contribute to the reconstruction of structures, artefacts, practices or 
institutions. The transactional approaches tend to suffer, as activity theorists 
Anna Stetsenko and Arievich (2004, p. 479) point out, from “a curious form of 
a ‘reductionism upwards’ … whereby the self is dissolved in the collective 
dynamics of social processes.” 
By contrast, cultural-historical and Deweyan pragmatist traditions were 
developed in close connection with developmental psychology or educational 
studies. That is why they supply articulated theories of learning and human 
thinking. Although these traditions recognise the primacy of practice and the 
social origins of the self, they also have viable concepts of relating individual 
thought and reflection and change in practices to each other. Dewey’s concept 
of reflective thought as a reconstruction of broken habits is an example of such 
an articulation.  
The distinction between signs and tools suggested by Vygotsky is 
probably insufficient for making sense of the new ICT-based cognitive 
artefacts, which are radically changing human agency and practices. A ready-
to-hand smartphone can be used as an example. An ever-growing assortment of 




dictionaries, guides (e.g. plant guides and bird guides with recorded birdsongs), 
cameras with the capability of sending photographs electronically, maps, 
satellite-connected route guides with timetables and so on, are being embodied 
in smartphones. Through internet connection, the smartphone provides access 
to e-mail and Facebook, e-commerce, bank services, Google and Wikipedia, as 
well as to libraries and scientific databases. Soon tablet computers, that is, 
equipments with high-quality screens such as the iPad, will make it possible to 
read material from libraries and databases. Such equipment is simultaneously a 
small portable material object; an external cultural memory and a generalised 
means of daily life and communication between people, in other words, a 
means of literally extending the mind (see Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Such 
extremely complex instrumentality and its consequences for human practice are 
at present poorly conceptualised.  That is why we welcome Lawson’s (2010) 
suggestion, for example, to study and develop further “extension theories”, 
such as McLuhan’s concept of media. 
Both activity theory and pragmatism regard the study of change by 
means of intervention and social experimentation a central challenge for the 
study of practices. Marx formulated this position in his eleventh thesis on 
Feuerbach (1888/1978, p. 127): “The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” Twenty years later Dewey 
(1908/1977, p. 104) agreed: “[T]he chief function of philosophy is not to find 
out what difference ready-made formulae make, if true, but to arrive at and to 
clarify their meaning as programs of behavior for modifying the existent 




education and ontogeny, the idea of making people’s lives better and creating 
conditions for the development of human capabilities has been central to both.  
Such a position calls for the development of an interventionist research 
strategy. Dewey’s experimentalist school in Chicago is one famous example. 
The revival of pragmatism in social theory has focused on reintroducing the 
concepts of habitual action and transaction as methodological alternatives to 
dualistic approaches in the social sciences (e.g. Joas, 1996, Kilpinen, 2009). 
Thus far, however, the challenge of solving the problems of social practices has 
hardly been discussed. We find that social experimentation or, to use Dewey’s 
term (1925/1988, p. 362), the formation of communities of inquiry for the 
recognition and resolution of important conflicts and problems of societal 
activities, remains a major challenge, both for the old as well as the new 
practice theories, and is crucial for understanding transformative agency (see 
e.g. Bernstein, 2010).  
The modernist conceptions of progress represented by the classical 
practice theories might seem too simplistic or even naïve today, but they 
provide tools and means for dealing with rapidly changing world (see 
Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1013). The concept of artefact mediation and 
remediation emphasises that such a community needs not only to formulate a 
joint working hypothesis for its future activity, but also to develop and evaluate 
practical means for its accomplishment. 
 
Reijo Miettinen 
Institute of Behavioural Sciences 
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